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monitoring and advising functions of directors. In addition, we find that busy boards have higher advising capacity compared to non-busy boards.
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One of the primary responsibilities of directors is to
perform their monitoring functions effectively. A concept
associated with director-effectiveness while performing this
responsibility is director busyness. Directors that are consid-
ered busy are generally criticized for potentially not putting
enough time and effort into performing their monitoring duties
as a result of board appointments at other firms. On the other
hand, these directors are praised for potentially providing focal
boards and CEOs with improved advising, which is considered
the other primary responsibility of directors, via valuable in-
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).other firms. The number of studies investigating these topics
regarding public firms in the Turkish capital market is very
limited. Studies such as Ararat and Cetin (2008), Kaymak and
Bektas (2008), Ararat, Aksu, and Cetin (2010), Ararat, Orbay,
and Yurtoglu (2010), and Ararat, Black, and Yurtoglu (2014)
mainly focus on director independence, which is the main
criteria that we employ in categorizing directors and boards as
busy, and calculating the proxy for advising quality in this
study. Keeping the findings of these studies in mind, we
investigate director busyness and advising. Specifically, we
attempt to provide insight into understanding whether firms
consider the monitoring and advising of directors as separate
functions and whether director busyness and advising have
effects on the performance of public firms listed on Borsa
Istanbul.
The terms “busy directors” and “busy boards” have become
popular in corporate governance research in recent decades.
Some of the early papers in literature investigating director
busyness are Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Ferris,
Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003), Perry and Peyer (2005),
and Fich and Shivdasani (2006). In these papers, the authorsting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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serving on three or more boards. In addition, they define a
busy board as a board where more than 50% of its members
are busy directors. Opponents of busy directors argue that
board memberships in multiple firms would have negative
effects, especially on directors' monitoring effectiveness. Since
the monitoring duties performed by directors require signifi-
cant time and effort, as directors receive additional board
seats, time constraints could be expected to become a more
serious issue, affecting a director's ability to monitor effec-
tively. This could potentially lead them to avoid some of their
responsibilities, such as attending board meetings and serving
on board committees (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010;
Ferris et al., 2003). In addition, additional seats in other
boards could lead to interlocking relationships with other di-
rectors and CEOs, leading to compromised independence and
poor monitoring (Fields & Keys, 2003; Stuart Yim, 2010), and
in turn, decreased firm performance and value (Field, Lowry,
& Mkrtchyan, 2013).
Empirical evidence on this topic is mixed. Ferris et al.
(2003) and Field et al. (2013) are unable to provide evi-
dence supportive of superior performance by firms with busy
boards. On the other hand, Fich and Shivdasani (2006), and
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel (2014) provide evidence that is
not in favor of busy directors and boards in terms of moni-
toring quality and firm performance. In addition, studies such
as Beasley (1996) and Core et al. (1999) provide evidence
suggesting that director busyness has negative effects on issues
such as fraud and CEO compensation. However, Ferris et al.
(2003) and Field et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting
that director busyness has positive effects on CEO compen-
sation and director committee servings and board meeting
attendance. On the other hand, Ferris et al. (2003) provide
evidence suggestive of positive returns when a firm announces
the appointment of a director with multiple board directorships
for the first time. However, this evidence contradicts the
findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2006).
Lastly, it should be kept in mind that directors, especially
independent ones, have reputational concerns, which is ex-
pected to lead them to be effective monitors. If they perform
their duties more effectively, this would signal their worth to
the market, leading them to be appointed as directors to other
firms. However, every director might not necessarily perceive
the reputational incentive at the same level, and might not
distribute her effort equally. Her level of effort could change
with relative prestige (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014).
Based on these arguments and findings, some reform ad-
vocates in U.S. markets call for limitations on the number of
outside directorships that directors can hold. In Turkish capital
markets, there are currently no such limitations. However, in
the future, any potential proponents of such limitations should
keep in mind that the issue of director busyness and the po-
tential costs as a result of decreased monitoring should be
considered without ignoring the potential benefits of director
busyness in the form of increased advising.
The advisory function of members of boards of directors
has attracted major attention in recent literature. Amongstudies that discuss the importance of the advisory function of
boards of directors are Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja
(2007), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), Chen (2008),
Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2013), Kim, Mauldin, and
Patro (2014), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2014). These
studies argue that board members with more connections
through outside directorships could be expected to have better
access to valuable resources such as information. As directors'
access to information increases, they could be expected to
provide advice of a higher quality to both executives of the
company and other board members. Naturally, high-quality
advice from directors could contribute to company's success
substantially (Adams, 2009). Knowledge and skills, as well as
connections to outside resources, could lead directors to
become more effective in performing their duties (Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009). In addition, a director's exposure to
diverse ideas and valuable political resources through external
directorships could be beneficial to the sending firm as well
(Oh, Labianca, & Chung, 2006). Also, the strategic advising
by advisory directors could improve the firm's ability to create
value in the long term (Faleye et al., 2013). Other studies such
as Adams (2009), Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009), and
Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) also provide arguments in
support of the potential benefits that could be provided by
directors with connections, in terms of increased advising
skills.
However, while focusing on the potential benefits provided
by advisory directors and boards, it should also be kept in
mind that directors, who consider themselves to be monitors,
could consider advisory directors to be free-riders, and
consequently, reduce their own efforts in performing their
monitoring functions (Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash; 2011,
2013). Also, it should be considered that not all firms might
benefit from advisory boards to the same extent. Coles et al.
(2008) argue that firms that are complex in nature would
require greater advice from directors. Coles et al. (2014) argue
that as the complexity level of the company increases, firm
value would be expected to increase with advising quality and
total advising.
In empirical studies, Adams (2009), Faleye et al. (2013),
and Kim et al. (2014) provide evidence supporting the argu-
ment that directors with outside directorships would gain
experience and perform as more effective advisors, leading to
increased firm value. Field et al. (2013) provide evidence
highlighting the importance of busy directors as valuable ad-
visors, who could potentially play a vital role in IPO firms,
since they lack experience with public firms. Faleye et al.
(2013) and Coles et al. (2014) provide evidence highlighting
the importance of the relationship between firm characteristics
and advisory needs.
The research on the advisory role of directors has started a
debate about the separation of the two main functions of di-
rectors. Studies such as Chen (2008), Adams (2009), Hwang
and Kim (2009), Stuart and Yim (2010), and Faleye,
Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) argue that increased monitoring
effectiveness by board members could come at the expense of
forgone advising effectiveness, potentially as a consequence of
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Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) and Kim et al. (2014) argue
that this view is not necessarily valid and monitoring and
advising could occur simultaneously. In support of the first
group of studies, we intend to provide insight into under-
standing whether busyness and advising functions of directors
matter to investors. In addition, to our best knowledge, this is
the first study to investigate advisory functioning of boards in
public firms in Turkey, quantitatively.
Readers should keep in mind that evidence regarding
corporate governance applications in emerging markets is
limited (Ararat & Dallas, 2011). However, the investigation of
these topics in emerging markets is important because dis-
cussions and recommendations regarding “superior” gover-
nance mechanisms and applications in developed countries
would not necessarily apply in the case of emerging markets.
Thus, more research on corporate governance in emerging
countries could help investors and policymakers have a better
understanding of dynamics of corporate governance, and
consequently could help attract more foreign institutional in-
vestors to emerging markets. These investors are vital for the
improvement of economies of these countries. A country's
corporate governance environment being better-understood
and perceived as legitimate could lead to increased national
income and wealth, as a consequence of the economic envi-
ronment being perceived as fair (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan,
2008).
It should also be noted that a potential shortcoming of this
study is the sample period covered, years 2012 and 2013. The
reason underlying the choice of these years is the enforcement
of compliance with the Principles of Corporate Governance
(PCG) by the Capital Markets Board of Turkey before the end
of the annual year 2012. Thus, following the establishment of
the PCG, public firms started disclosing detailed information
regarding their board members to the public. Consequently,
our sample covers 288 firms and 2079 board members for the
end of year 2012, and 286 firms and 2066 board members for
the end of year 2013.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the data. Section 3 presents the results, whereas
Section 4 provides additional tests. Finally, Section 5 is the
conclusion.
2. Data
In this study, we use hand-collected data gathered from the
annual reports submitted by public firms to the Public
Disclosure Platform. When necessary, data was also gathered
from the official web pages of the firms. We exclude firms in
the banking sector. The reason is that banks are subject to
additional regulations enforced by the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency of Turkey. However, other financial firms,
such as factoring firms, are not excluded from the sample,
since there are no regulations that would call for them to have
unique corporate governance applications compared to the rest
of the firms in the sample. As a result, our sample includes 290
firms and 2079 board members for the end of year 2012, and287 firms and 2066 board members for the end of year 2013.
Data on all measures employed in this study are not available
for all directors and boards. For instance, for some directors,
no data is available regarding their educational background.
Before we present the descriptive statistics, we define the
variables presented throughout the paper. The explanations for
variables that are self explanatory are skipped. Chairman is the
CEO states whether the CEO is the same individual as the
chairman. Independent committee variables state whether all
the members of these committees are independent directors.
Shares owned by foreigners states what percentage of the
firm's shares are owned by foreign blockholders, where a
blockholder is defined as a party that owns at least 5% of the
shares of the firm. Director ownership states the percentage of
shares owned by a director alone. Total board ownership states
the percentage of shares owned by all members of the board as
a whole. Educated abroad states whether a director has earned
a degree of bachelors or higher from an institution not located
in Turkey. A director is defined as a finance expert is she has
been, or currently is, the CEO or on the board of a financial
institution. A director is defined as an accounting expert if she
is certified as a CPA or equivalent. Membership number states
how many for-profit firms' boards of directors on which the
director sits.
A director is defined as an independent director if she meets
the independence requirements imposed by the Principles of
Corporate Governance. For busyness definitions, we follow
Fich and Shivdasani (2006). A director is defined as a busy
director if she is an independent director on the focal firm, and
she is on the board of at least three different firms that are not
non-profits. A busy board is defined as a board, in which at
least 50% of the independent directors are busy. However, for
board busyness, we employ a modified definition of busyness
as well. In the alternative definition, we revoke the require-
ment of independence in order to be considered a busy di-
rector. The reason for the use of this alternative definition is
that the concept of independent directors is very new for
Turkish capital markets, and, on average, firms employ
approximately two independent directors on their boards.
Therefore, based on the original busyness definition by Fich
and Shivdasani (2006), only one firm quoted at Borsa Istan-
bul can be considered a busy board. Thus, in our modified
version, a busy board is defined as a board, in which at least
50% of the directors are busy, with no independence
requirement.
To calculate our first proxy for the advising quality of
boards, we follow Coles et al. (2014). We determine which
other firms' boards the independent director sits, and count the
number of directors on those firms' boards (excluding her).
Then, we calculate the total number of outside board con-
nections for independent board members on a specific board,
eliminating duplicate ties for board members. This sum is
called “total advising”. We then calculate “advising quality”,
by dividing total advising by the number of independent di-
rectors on that specific board. In addition, we consider external
connections only in other public firms, since data is not
available for non-public firms. For example if director Abc
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T Corp. is not a public company, we are not able to find the
other directors in that company, to which Abc Xyz is
connected.
Our second proxy is the “experience” of a director. It is a
dummy variable that considers whether or not a director in our
sample has prior experience in the industry of the focal firm. If
the director has previous experience in the same industry, the
value of the dummy variable is 1. A director that has worked at
(been on the board of) a firm in the same industry previously is
considered an experienced director. Directors that are assigned
the value of 0 for the experience proxy are assumed to have
lower advising quality, compared to directors that are assigned
a value of 1 for the proxy. At this point, it should be noted that
this proxy could be considered a subjective proxy since the
categorization of a director as experienced or not is influenced
by the authors' decision criterion. This is an outcome of the
fact that in the curricula vitae of directors, in a majority of the
cases, their past experience is not detailed in terms of how
many years a director has worked at another company and in
which position. It should also be noted that this proxy is
applied in the cases where detailed curricula vitae are avail-
able. In the cases that the authors were not certain about the
experience of the directors, the directors were not categorized
as experienced or not. In addition, there is no independence
requirement.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the firms in
our sample. The sample contains around 290 firms, quoted at
the primary and secondary markets of Borsa Istanbul. AlmostTable 1
Descriptive statistics for firms and directors.
2012 2013
Panel A: firm properties
Number of firms 290 287
CEO is on the board 152 148
Chairman is the CEO 39 35
Audit committee exists 273 278
Governance committee exists 267 276
Risk committee exists 103 217
Busy board (no independence requirement) 140 140
Board size 7.07 7.21
Independent member number 2.12 2.15
Panel B: director characteristics
Number of directors 2079 2066
Female 238 229
Foreigner 226 237
Educated abroad 778 753
Finance expert 745 769
Accounting expert 210 213
Lawyer 126 111
Professor 119 119
Audit committee member 551 559
Governance committee member 628 664
Risk committee member 236 487
Average directorship number 3.32 3.45
Age 54.33 54.71
Independent director 607 613
Busy director 171 195half of the boards include the CEO, and in only a small portion
of them, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Most of
the firms have audit and governance committees, whereas the
same cannot be stated for risk committees, especially by the
end of 2012. Almost half of the firms have busy boards when
our modified busy board definition is applied. The average
board size is approximately 7, with 2 of the directors being
independent.
Table 1 also presents the descriptive statistics for the di-
rectors in our sample, which includes around 2070 directors.
Around 10% of these directors are female. A similar figure is
valid for the percentage of directors that are foreign.
Approximately 36% of the directors have degrees earned at an
institution located outside of Turkey. A good portion of these
directors are finance experts, whereas the same cannot be
stated in terms of being accounting experts, lawyers, or pro-
fessors. These directors hold, on average, around 3.40 board
seats in for-profit firms, with an average age of approximately
54. Almost 30% of these directors are independent, and
approximately 9% of them are busy directors.
3. Results3.1. Busy directors and boardsThe first set of our findings regarding director and board
busyness are presented in Panel B of Table 2. The Table shows
that, on average, directors have 3.32 and 3.45 directorships,
including the directorship in the focal firm, at the end of 2012
and 2013, consecutively. Approximately 30% of these di-
rectors do not have any outside directorships at the end of
2013. Around 10% of the directors in the sample are busy
directors. This low figure can be explained by the requirement
that directors need to be independent in order to be considered
candidates to be busy, and the fact that the majority of di-
rectors in the sample are not independent in the first place, as
can be observed in Panel A of the same table. Less than 1% of
the boards are busy boards, when the requirement of inde-
pendence is applied, at the end of 2013. However, when we
revoke the independence requirement, we observe that slightly
more than half of the firms in the sample have busy boards at
the end of 2013. We observe similar figures for the end of
2012.
Next, we investigate various characteristics and properties
of busy directors and boards in more detail. First, we present
our findings regarding the characteristics of directors, who
have no outside directorships, in comparison to those that have
multiple directorships. What we observe in Table 3, for the
end of 2013, is that 9.84% of directors with no outside di-
rectorships are CEOs in the focal firm, a figure significantly
higher than for those with outside directorship. This figure is
supportive of the argument by Perry and Peyer (2005) that
executives who hold multiple board seats might not be pro-
ductive for the focal firms. An interesting figure we observe is
that, on average, 6.44% of directors with no outside direc-
torship are chairmen in the focal firms, which is significantly
lower than the 16.57% of directors with outside directorships.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for busyness, independence and advising.
2012 2013
Panel A: independence
Mean # of independent directors in boards 2.12 2.15
Mean % of independent directors in boards 30.65% 31.06%
Total # of independent directors in firms
0 3 1
1 3 2
2 249 247
3 25 27
4 8 9
5 1 1
Panel B: busyness
Mean % of busy directors in boards 9.26% 10.35%
Mean % of independent busy boards 0.39% 0.38%
Mean % of any busy boards 54.05% 53.21%
Mean total directorships by directors 3.32 3.45
Total directorship by directors
1 568 560
2 378 402
3 137 154
4 408 388
5 100 106
6 82 81
7þ 174 204
Panel C: advising
Mean total advising 5.36 4.94
Mean advising quality per director 2.41 2.14
% of firms in total advising brackets
Zero 56.40% 57.14%
1 e Mean 10.29% 11.85%
More than mean 33.31% 31.01%
% of firms in advising quality per director brackets
Zero 55.99% 56.99%
1 e Mean 6.69% 12.59%
More than mean 37.32% 30.42%
Table 3
Directors with and without outside directorships.
2012
No outside directorship Outsid
Number of directors 568 1511
CEO of the firm 8.43% 6.82%
Female 10.92% 11.65%
Chairman of the firm 7.92%*** 16.32%
Independent 41.59%*** 24.72%
Foreigner 5.63%*** 12.84%
Educated abroad 27.07%*** 47.72%
Financial expert 28.99%*** 42.99%
Accounting expert 9.43% 11.77%
Lawyer 8.49%** 5.60%
Professor 9.41%*** 4.77%
Audit committee member 40.19%*** 23.36%
Governance committee member 36.04%** 30.33%
Risk committee member 14.34% 11.10%
Age 53.96 54.47
Share ownership % 1.82% 2.08%
***, **, and * present significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The percentages
among that directorship group. For instance, 8.43% of directors with no outside d
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in Turkey, where families or business groups commonly
control multiple firms, and an individual, who belongs to the
family or group, is the chairman of the focal firm, as well as a
director in the other firms controlled by the family or the
group.
On the other hand, the percentage of directors in the no-
outside-directorship group that are independent is 42.93%,
which is a significantly higher figure than for the other group,
24.75%. This finding is interesting because independent di-
rectors are generally considered to be better monitors, and it
could be argued that directors with multiple directorships
could not have sufficient time and availability for the focal
firm. Thus, firms might prefer to appoint directors with no
outside directorships as independent directors, with the belief
that directors that sit on the boards of other firms would not be
effective monitors.
Another observation from Table 3 is that 46.75% of the
directors with multiple directorships have received education
abroad, as opposed to only 26.13% of directors in the no-
outside-directorship group. This could be an outcome of the
common belief in Turkey that the quality of education in other
countries, especially in the US and UK, where most of the
directors in the sample got their education, is higher. Thus,
directors with degrees from foreign institutions are valued
more highly by firms and, so are appointed to more boards.
What we also observe in Table 3 is that 45.08% of directors
with multiple directorships are financial experts, which is
significantly higher than the percentage of directors in the
other group. This could potentially be an indicator of prefer-
ences by firms to appoint directors with financial expertise,
which could be perceived as an especially valuable skill in the
aftermath of the financial crises experienced in the last decade.
Another surprising observation is regarding committee
appointments. Only 22.93% of directors with multiple board2013
e directorship No outside directorship Outside directorship
560 1507
9.84%*** 6.24%
11.45% 10.95%
6.44%*** 16.57%
42.93%*** 24.75%
6.26%*** 13.40%
26.13%*** 46.75%
30.02%*** 45.08%
10.12% 11.89%
9.07%** 4.48%
7.94%* 5.48%
40.36%*** 22.93%
35.82%* 31.77%
26.18% 23.33%
54.05 54.95
1.55% 2.03%
in the table present the percentage of directors with the defined characteristic
irectorship are CEOs in the focal firms in 2012.
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significantly lower compared to the group of directors with no
outside directorships. This could be explained by a potential
preference by firms to appoint directors with no outside di-
rectorships to these committees, based on the beliefs that these
directors could put more time and effort into their tasks on
committees, and that directors with multiple board member-
ships cannot perform monitoring functions effectively. The
findings regarding the independence of directors with outside
board memberships, as well as their appointments to com-
mittees that are expected to perform important monitoring
functions, could be considered evidence supporting the argu-
ment by Chen (2008), Adams (2009), Hwang and Kim (2009),
Stuart and Yim (2010), and Faleye et al. (2011) that increased
monitoring effectiveness by board members could come at the
expense of forgone advising effectiveness, potentially as a
consequence of the trade-off between these two functions. In
other words, busyness could potentially improve the advising
capacity of directors, while worsening their monitoring
capacities.
Next, we present our findings regarding busy boards in
firms quoted at Borsa Istanbul. The findings are presented in
Table 4, where we compare the properties of firms with busy
boards to those of firms with non-busy boards. In 9 of these
firms, the chairman is also the firm's CEO, which is signifi-
cantly lower than for the firms with non-busy boards. InTable 4
Busy boards versus non-busy boards (no independence requirement).
2012 2013
Busy
board
Non-busy
board
Busy
board
Non-busy
board
Number of firms 140 119 140 124
Chairman is the CEO 13** 24 9** 25
Audit committee exists 135 110 136 122
Governance committee exists 134 108 136 120
Risk committee exists 58 37 116 88
Mean % of public shares 35.22% 33.79% 33.15% 33.65%
Mean % of foreigner-owned
shares
6.94%** 13.66% 8.30%** 14.96%
Mean board size 7.36** 6.86 7.39** 6.87
Mean independent member
number
2.12 2.15 2.18 2.13
Mean % of female directors 11.43% 11.79% 11.25% 12.04%
Mean % of foreigner directors 8.67% 11.52% 8.79% 12.66%
Mean firm age 35.18 32.55 34.02 32.95
Mean public years 16.57 14.58 15.86 14.98
Mean blockholder number 2.07 1.97 2.14 1.89
Mean foreign blockholder
number
0.16* 0.29 0.24 0.31
Mean blockholder shares 62.64% 63.94% 64.44% 64.01%
Mean audit committee
member #
2.00 2.04 1.97* 2.09
Mean governance committee
member #
2.52** 2.28 2.52 2.55
Mean risk committee member # 1.22* 0.87 2.12* 1.85
Mean advice quality per
director
3.18*** 1.41 2.78*** 1.37
Mean total advice quality 7.09*** 3.21 6.34*** 3.15
***, **, and * present significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.finance literature, when chairman is also the CEO of the firm,
it is considered an indication that the chairman is powerful. A
powerful chairman or CEO would be more likely to make
decisions herself, rather than relying on the opinions of other
potential advisors, such as board members. Thus, when the
majority of directors in the firm are busy, they could poten-
tially perform less-effective monitoring, and the chairman
could have more freedom in decision making. Therefore, firms
with busy boards might potentially prefer not to appoint the
chairman as the CEO, in an attempt to prevent a powerful
chairman or CEO.
Table 4 also shows that the average share ownership by
foreign blockholders in firms with busy boards is significantly
lower than in firms with non-busy boards. This could poten-
tially point to a preference by foreign investors towards non-
busy boards. Also, in firms with busy boards, the average
board size is significantly higher, 7.39, compared to firms in
the other group, whereas the average number of independent
directors is 2.18, on average.
Lastly, the mean advice quality per director and total advice
quality for firms with busy boards are significantly higher than
firms with non-busy boards, as can be observed in Table 4.
Based on these figures, we can suggest that firms with busy
boards have higher-quality advising. Directors, who are on the
boards of other firms, have valuable external connections, and
probably could provide better advising to the board. Still, it
should be kept in mind that as a result of the definition of
advisory measures employed in the study, directors with more
than 3 directorships would be expected to have more external
connections. We observe similar patterns for the end of 2012.
Next, we present our findings regarding the characteristics
of busy directors, in comparison to non-busy directors, in
Table 5. It can be observed in Tables 2 and 5 that because of
the independence requirement in the definition of director
busyness, around 10% of the directors in the sample are busy.
However, we believe that the findings in Table 3 provide a
deeper understanding of the busyness of directors, free of the
requirement of independence. As can be observed in Table 5,
at the end of 2013, 195 of the directors were busy. None of
these busy directors are CEOs in the focal firms. This is nat-
ural because since directors are required to be independent in
order to be considered busy, it is not possible that the CEOs of
the firms could be busy under the independence requirement.
Only 1.55% of busy directors are chairmen in the focal firms,
which is significantly lower than directors that are not busy. In
light of our previous discussion regarding directors with
multiple board seats and being chairmen, this time we could
argue that the chairmen of firms potentially do not meet the
independence criteria of the Principles of Corporate Gover-
nance, and thus, they are rarely independent. As a natural
result, they are not considered busy directors, since they do not
meet the independence requirement of the busyness definition.
We also observe in Table 5 that 55.32% of the busy di-
rectors are financial experts, and 21.28% of them are ac-
counting experts. These figures are significantly higher than
for directors that are non-busy. Once again, our previous dis-
cussion regarding the higher value given to these experts by
Table 5
Busy directors versus non-busy directors (with independence requirement).
2012 2013
Busy
director
Non-busy
director
Busy
director
Non-busy
director
Number of directors 171 1676 195 1698
CEO of the firm 0.00%*** 8.00% 0.00%*** 8.13%
Female 7.02% 11.69% 7.69% 11.31%
Chairman of the firm 1.18%*** 15.40% 1.55%*** 15.32%
Independent 100.00%*** 22.54% 100.00%*** 22.32%
Foreigner 7.60% 11.28% 6.67%* 12.49%
Educated abroad 46.43% 40.76% 45.70% 40.30%
Financial expert 49.70%*** 37.89% 55.32%*** 39.51%
Accounting expert 20.96%*** 10.17% 21.28%*** 10.52%
Lawyer 3.53% 6.62% 4.71% 5.98%
Professor 15.98%*** 4.83% 14.74%*** 5.18%
Audit committee
member
92.12%*** 21.58% 90.58%*** 21.03%
Governance committee
Member
56.97%*** 29.73% 57.59%*** 30.70%
Risk committee member 26.06%*** 10.88% 51.83%*** 21.80%
Age 57.71*** 53.89 57.38*** 54.21
Share ownership % 0.00%*** 2.37% 0.00%*** 2.46%
***, **, and * present significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The percent-
ages in the table present the percentage of directors with the defined charac-
teristic among that directorship group. For instance, 7.02% of directors that are
busy are females in 2012.
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crises and accounting scandals of the last decade, these experts
might now be more-commonly employed by firms. In addi-
tion, 14.74% of them are professors. Once again, these pro-
fessors might potentially be valued more highly by firms, and
in turn be appointed as independent directors to boards.
Another interesting pattern we observe in Table 5 is that
around 90% of busy directors are members of audit commit-
tees, which is significantly higher than directors in the non-
busy group. We observe similar patterns for governance and
risk committees. One could argue that these figures contrast
with the findings presented in Table 3 regarding directors with
multiple board memberships not being assigned to monitoring
positions. However, it should be kept in mind that busy di-
rectors, by definition, are independent directors, and the
Principles of Corporate Governance require audit committee
members to be independent directors.
Lastly, we observe that busy directors are significantly
older, 57.38 years old, compared to non-busy directors. This
finding contradicts the argument by Core et al. (1999) that as
directors get older, they would become less effective. If older
directors were considered less-effective, one would not expect
them to be appointed to more boards than younger directors. In
terms of the benefit of diversity on the board, younger di-
rectors might bring more energy and less risk-aversion,
whereas older directors might provide stability and wisdom
(Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011). It is possible that
firms value the stability and wisdom that older directors could
bring to the board. Still, it is also possible that these directors
are the older members of families that have the control over
many firms, and therefore these directors have multiple
directorships.We also observe in Table 5 that, on average, busy directors
hold 0.00% of shares in the focal firms, whereas non-busy
directors own 2.46% of shares. One could argue that busy
directors have reputational concerns, and might not need
additional incentives in the form of share ownership. How-
ever, one should also keep in mind that the Principles of
Corporate Governance prohibit directors from owning more
than 1% of shares in firms in order to be considered inde-
pendent, and thus a busy director candidate. We observe
similar pattern for most of the director characteristics at the
end of 2012.3.2. Advisory directorsOur first set of findings regarding the advisory functions of
boards is presented in Panel C of Table 2. We observe in Table
2 that the mean total advising is 5.36 and 4.94 at the end of
2012 and 2013, consecutively. In addition, the advising quality
per director is 2.41 and 2.14 at the end of 2012 and 2013,
consecutively. Among firms in the sample, around 56% have a
score of zero for total advising and advising quality per di-
rector. These figures do not, however, imply that these firms
have no advising provided by directors. It only suggests that
these firms' directors provide less advising than firms with
higher advising scores.
In untabulated tests, we investigate the properties of firms
in various brackets for total advising. The brackets are deter-
mined based on the mean advising score and the 75%
percentile of the advising scores. An interesting pattern we
observe is that almost all of the chairmen that are also CEOs
sit on boards of firms with a zero total advising score. It is
possible that these chairmen are powerful chairmen and, as we
discussed earlier, they do not value advising from outside di-
rectors as highly.
Also, as we discussed previously and as can be observed in
Table 4, the mean advice quality per director and total advice
quality for firms with busy boards are significantly higher
compared to firms with non-busy boards. Based on these fig-
ures, we can suggest that firms with busy boards have higher-
quality advising. Busy directors could build vital external
connections to valuable resources, and with other directors, as
a result of multiple directorships, potentially leading them to
become better advisors.
These connections would be especially important for
newly-public firms (Field et al., 2013). In untabulated results,
we observe that in firms that went through an IPO in the
previous year, the average number of directorships of board
members is significantly higher than in other firms in the
sample. However, the advising quality per director and total
advising quality in these firms are significantly lower than in
other firms. This finding is not supportive of Field et al.'s
(2013) argument. One potential cause of this situation could
be that these firms have less independent directors. And as we
discussed earlier, in order for a director to bring advising
quality to a board, based on the advising measures employed
in this study, they need to be independent directors in the first
place.
Table 6
Alternative advising quality proxy: experience.
2012 2013
Non-experienced Experienced Non-experienced Experienced
Number of directors 520 1376 524 1356
CEO of the firm 1.15%*** 9.52% 1.53%*** 9.37%
Female 11.15% 11.34% 10.31% 10.84%
Chairman of the firm 5.04%*** 17.97% 4.42%*** 17.86%
Independent 56.54%*** 19.44% 60.31%*** 18.36%
Foreigner 3.85%*** 13.52% 3.63%*** 14.60%
Educated abroad 36.97%*** 44.25% 36.11%*** 43.86%
Financial expert 42.49%** 37.57% 45.31%*** 39.04%
Accounting expert 17.76%*** 8.74% 18.04%*** 8.82%
Lawyer 14.09%*** 3.62% 12.89%*** 3.17%
Professor 13.69%*** 3.40% 13.67%*** 3.32%
Audit committee member 47.01%*** 18.65% 56.64%*** 16.80%
Governance committee
member
44.11%*** 27.31% 47.85%*** 27.51%
Risk committee member 16.97%*** 10.60% 37.30%*** 20.12%
Age 52.72** 55.02 52.88*** 55.50
Total board membership # 2.60*** 3.74 2.70*** 3.86
Share ownership % 0.50%*** 2.54% 0.32%*** 2.64%
***, **, and * present significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
1 Here, the market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the number
of shares outstanding by the price of shares (Guclu, 2012).
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based on our alternative proxy: experience. Rather than pre-
senting results based on total advisingquality scores for firms,we
present findings pointing out to the interactions of various di-
rector characteristics with the alternative advising quality proxy.
In other words, our focus is not on the total advising quality of
firms, but rather on the individual advising qualities of directors.
Our findings are presented in Table 6. In both years, a
significantly higher percentage of directors that are experi-
enced, and thus are (assumed to be) superior advisors, are also
CEOs or chairmen. This may not be surprising, since experi-
ence could be an important factor in a top executive's career
path to the top. Still, the Table presents very interesting pat-
terns regarding the argument that increased monitoring
effectiveness could come at the expense of forgone advising
effectiveness. The Table shows that a significantly lower per-
centage of experienced directors are independent directors,
only 18.36%, as opposed to 60.31% of non-experienced di-
rectors, at the end of 2013. In finance literature, independent
directors are considered to be more effective monitors
(Armstrong, Core, & Guay, 2014; Knyazeva, Knyazeva, &
Masulis, 2013). Additionally, our evidence suggests that
experienced directors, who are expected to be superior advi-
sors, are not appointed as monitors as frequently.
In addition, the table shows that a significantly lower per-
centage of directors that are superior advisors are appointed to
the committees of boards. Only 16.80% of these superior
advisor directors serve on audit committees. Directors on these
committees are expected to provide effective monitoring.
Once again, our evidence suggests that directors that are ex-
pected to be superior advisors are not appointed as monitors as
frequently. Thus, our evidence supports the trade-off argument
mentioned previously. Firms appear to not prefer appointing
superior advisor directors to positions that are expected to
perform effective monitoring functions.The Table also shows that directors that are categorized as
superior advisors serve, on average, on the boards of 3.86 firms,
whereas the remaining directors serve on the boards of 2.70
boards, on average. Another potentially surprising pattern in
Table 6 is that a significantly lower percentage of directors that
are assumed to be superior advisors possess some form of tech-
nical expertise. One could expect that directors with professional
technical expertise, such as financial experts, accounting experts,
lawyers or professors, would serve on board committees as ad-
visors. However, our findings suggest the opposite. A lower
percentage of superior advisors possess technical expertise. Still,
it should be kept in mind that directors lacking previous expe-
rience in the industry as a result of their career, especially in the
case of professors, would cause them to be categorized as di-
rectors that are not experienced should be kept in mind.
4. Busyness, advising and firm performance
In this section, we present our findings regarding the rela-
tionship between busyness, advising, and firm performance.
The analysis in this section requires additional data. For this
purpose, we gathered financial statement data for the firms in
our sample from _Is‚ Yatırım, which is one of numerous data
providers for firms quoted at Borsa Istanbul. In addition, we
gathered market-to-book (ME/BE) value data for the firms in
our sample from Borsa Istanbul.1 Since we employ market-to-
book value in our analysis, we excluded all types of financial
firms from the sample. In addition, we winsorize firms with
extreme ME/BE values.
The tests we employ are based on the assumption that a
high ME/BE is an indicator of good management and
Table 7
Busyness, advising and firm performance.
2012 2013
ROA ME/BE ROA ME/BE
Panel A: descriptive statistics
Busy 0.0431 1.3232 0.0311 1.7401
Non-Busy 0.0331 2.3733 0.0154 1.9032
Advisory 0.0401 2.6578* 0.0344 2.1904*
Non-Advisory 0.0319 1.2481 0.0201 1.5641
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: multivariate analysis
Advisory board (0,1) 0.043 (0.85)
# of experienced directors 0.451 (0.24)
Busy board (0,1) 0.185 (0.42)
Busy director ratio 0.961 (0.32)
Average dir. per independent
dir.
0.095 (0.13)
Average directorship per
director
0.013 (0.91)
Controlled firm (0,1) 2.342 (0.00) 2.322 (0.00) 2.327 (0.00) 2.301 (0.00) 1.429 (0.20) 1.565 (0.16)
Blockholder number 0.724 (0.03) 0.682 (0.04) 0.732 (0.03) 0.719 (0.03) 0.690 (0.02) 0.710 (0.03)
Blockholder shares % 11.439 (0.01) 11.076 (0.01) 11.464 (0.01) 11.306 (0.01) 11.600 (0.01) 11.619 (0.01)
Board ownership % 10.926 (0.08) 11.156 (0.07) 10.883 (0.08) 10.888 (0.09) 3.009 (0.64) 2.970 (0.63)
CEO ownership % 7.346 (0.25) 7.465 (0.23) 7.669 (0.23) 7.372 (0.25) 2.196 (0.73) 1.136 (0.86)
Chairman ownership % 10.977 (0.09) 11.175 (0.08) 11.034 (0.09) 10.908 (0.09) 2.239 (0.75) 1.778 (0.79)
# of board committees 0.338 (0.04) 0.321 (0.04) 0.324 (0.04) 0.321 (0.05) 0.313 (0.04) 0.266 (0.11)
CEO duality (0,1) 2.232 (0.00) 2.031 (0.00) 2.320 (0.00) 2.187 (0.00) 5.053 (0.03) 5.086 (0.01)
Log of board size 1.400 (0.16) 1.459 (0.13) 1.763 (0.15) 1.356 (0.31) 1.645 (0.10) 0.490 (0.80)
Independent director ratio 5.440 (0.04) 5.955 (0.03) 6.205 (0.06) 5.866 (0.06) 4.990 (0.08) 2.178 (0.58)
Firm size 0.320 (0.23) 0.358 (0.17) 0.249 (0.35) 0.346 (0.23) 0.032 (0.92) 0.143 (0.67)
ROA 1.148 (0.29) 1.277 (0.27) 0.692 (0.47) 1.160 (0.29) 2.555 (0.04) 2.864 (0.02)
Depreciation expense/sales 1.210 (0.63) 1.247 (0.63) 0.982 (0.69) 1.177 (0.657) 3.655 (0.47) 3.834 (0.40)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.392 0.395 0.396 0.391 0.422 0.438
***, **, * present significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust p-values are reported in parentheses. In ownership variables, if a director owns
3% of a firm's stocks, the variable is assigned a value of 0.03 in STATA. Therefore, the coefficients for ownership variables should be considered accordingly, even
though it has no effect on our results.
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BE values, such as being a measure of growth opportunities,
we also employ return on asset (ROA) in our tests as an
operating performance indicator. It is assumed that this vari-
able would not reflect a firm's future investment opportunities
(Fich & Shivdasani, 2006).
Our findings are presented in Table 7. Panel A of Table 7
presents descriptive statistics. Here, we present average ROA
and ME/BE values for firms that have busy boards in com-
parison to firms that do not have busy boards. We observe that
in both years, firms with busy boards do not have significantly
higher ROA or ME/BE values, on average, than firms that do
not have busy boards. A similar situation is observed when we
compare the average values of these variables for firms that
have total advising scores higher than zero and firms that have
total advising scores equal to zero. Thus, it appears that firms
that have busy boards or higher advising qualities do not
perform significantly better or worse than firms that have non-
busy boards or lower advising quality.
Next, we estimate firm-fixed effect regressions of firm
performance, measured by ME/BE, and busyness and advisingvariables. In addition, we estimate the same regressions by
employing ROA as a performance measure. In untabulated
results, we observe that when ROA is employed in the re-
gressions, the p-values for our main variables of interest (busy
board, advisory board, number of experienced directors) are
even higher than the p-values for these variables as presented
in Panel B of Table 7. In the multivariate tests, we employed
various corporate governance and financial characteristic
variables that could potentially affect firm performance,
following Fich and Shivdasani (2006, Table 4, p. 702).
The variables included in the models are: (i) advisory
board: a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has a total
advising score of zero or otherwise, (ii) the number of expe-
rienced directors on a board, (iii) busy board: a dummy vari-
able indicating whether a firm has a busy board (with no
independence requirement) or not, (iv) busy director ratio: the
ratio of busy directors to the total number of directors in the
board, (v) average directorships per independent director: the
ratio of directorship number of independent directors to the
number of independent directors in the board, (vi) controlled
firm: a dummy variable indicating whether 50% of the shares
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holders, (viii) total shares owned by blockholders, (ix) shares
owned by members of the board, (x) shares owned by the
CEO, (xi) shares owned by the chairman, (xii) the number of
committees that exist, (xiii) CEO duality: a dummy variables
indicating whether the CEO is the same individual as the
chairman, (xiv) the logarithm of the number of directors in the
board, (xv) independent director ratio: the ratio of the number
of independent directors to the total number of directors in the
board, (xvi) firm size: the logarithm of sales, and (xvii) growth
opportunities: the ratio of depreciation expense to sales.2
When we employ ME/BE as the dependent variable, we also
included ROA in the control variables. When ROA is
employed as the dependent variable, ROA is replaced with
return on sales as a control variable.
As can be observed in Panel B of Table 7, Model (1) shows
that the coefficient for the busy board dummy variable is
positive and statistically insignificant. Similarly, Model (2)
shows that the coefficient for the busy director ratio variable is
positive and statistically insignificant. Model (3) and Model
(4) also show insignificant coefficient values for the other two
busyness measures employed in alternative model specifica-
tions. Based on these findings, we can suggest that there is no
significant relationship between director or board busyness
and firm performance. As mentioned earlier, when ROA is
employed in the models as a dependent variable, we obtain
parallel results. It should also be noted that, unlike Fich and
Shivdasani (2006), since our Models did not estimate any
coefficient values for our main variables interest, we do not
include any interaction terms in our models.
To test the potential effects of director advising quality on
firm performance, we also include an advisory board indicator
variable in Model 5. The coefficient for this variable is positive
and statistically insignificant. In Model 6, we include the total
number of directors in the board that have previous experience
in the industry. Once again, the coefficient for this variable is
positive and statistically insignificant. We obtain parallel
findings when ROA is employed in the models as the depen-
dent variable. Based on these figures, we can suggest that there
is no significant relationship between director advising quality
and firm performance.
Overall, our multivariate test results suggest that director
busyness and director advising quality has no significant effect
on firm performance.
5. Conclusions
Directors with more connections through outside director-
ships could be expected to have better access to valuable re-
sources such as information. Thus, they could be expected to
perform their advising functions more effectively. However,2 Some of these variables are also employed in studies such as Kandir
(2010), Alp, Ban, Demirgunes, and Kilic (2010), and Sayilgan and Sayman
(2012), investigating firm value and other important corporate decisions in
firms quoted at Borsa Istanbul. The majority of them are also the variables in
Fich and Shivdasani's (2006) model.opponents of busy directors argue that they might not be able
to put enough time and effort into performing their monitoring
duties as a result of board appointments in other firms. Based
on these two views, some researchers argue that increased
advising effectiveness could come at the expense of forgone
monitoring effectiveness, as a consequence of the trade-off
between these two functions. In this study, we investigate di-
rector busyness and advising for firms quoted at Borsa Istan-
bul, in an attempt to examine whether firms value this
potential trade-off and whether director busyness and
increased advising lead to increased firm performance.
Our findings show that compared to directors with no
outside board appointments, a lower percentage of directors
with outside directorships are assigned as independent di-
rectors and audit committee members. We observe a similar
pattern when we investigate the board and committee ap-
pointments of directors who are experienced in the industry,
and therefore assumed to provide superior advising. In the
case of directors with multiple board memberships, a lower
percentage of these advisory directors are appointed to
monitoring positions on boards. This could be considered
suggesting that firms potentially value the trade-off between
the monitoring and advising functions of directors, and prefer
not to appoint directors with multiple directorships, and
potentially superior advising skills, to monitoring positions.
Our findings also show that boards on which at least 50% of
directors are busy, have higher total advice quality and mean
advice quality per director than non-busy boards. Based on
these findings, one could suggest that firms with busy boards
might have higher-quality advising.
Lastly, our findings show that firms that have busy boards
or higher advising qualities do not perform significantly better
or worse than firms that have non-busy boards or lower
advising quality in the sample period. In addition, multivariate
tests provide evidence suggesting that there is no significant
relationship between board busyness and firm performance.
Also, we are unable to find any significant relationship be-
tween director advising quality and firm performance.
Based on these findings, we can argue that future arguments
potentially calling for limitations on the number of board seats
that directors can have should consider the issue very carefully.
Even though multiple board appointments could potentially
affect the monitoring capabilities of directors negatively, the
additional advising skills that could be gained through these
appointments should not be ignored. Research on developed
economies could suggest that director busyness could be
harmful for firm performance and value. Yet the dynamics of
corporate governance applications in emerging markets, such
as Turkey, could be substantially different. And what could be
performance-diminishing in developed countries might not
have the same adverse effects in emerging markets.
In future studies, researchers could further investigate di-
rector busyness and advising for Borsa Istanbul firms, perhaps
through an instrumental variables approach as data become
available for longer periods of time, or they could investigate
the reaction of markets to appointments and departures of busy
and advisory directors in public firms via event studies.
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